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PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL FISCAL REFORM: 
SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
Robert E. Looney, Peter C. Frederiksen, George M.Worley, 
and Michael A. Schaub* 
ABSTRACT. This paper examines whether any relationship exists between 
success or failure of policy reform on the one hand, and various 
political/economic conditions in place at the time of reform on the other. 
Nineteen countries were scored using three financial variables to measure the 
degree of success or failure of the reform. The independent variables were 
country scores for ten different economic and political conditions. The 
independent variables were used to try and predict a priori which of the nineteen 
countries would succeed and which would fail. Eighteen of the nineteen 
countries were correctly placed into their respective success group. However 
only three of the ten conditions appeared important in predicting success: a 
visionary leader, a crisis, and a comprehensive program. Other writers have 
suggested different sets of predicting variables. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In a recent series of papers edited by Williamson (1994), the 
political conditions necessary for successful economic and fiscal reform 
were discussed in detail. In one of the most illustrative papers, 
Williamson and Haggard (1994) examined thirteen countries to see 
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whether or not a particular country's ability to embrace economic reform 
was in any way influenced by the political process in the country. The 
study methodology was a country-by-country review to derive some 
empirical generaliz.ations on the politics of economic reform. Williamson 
and Haggard (1994: 589) concluded "It is obvious at a glance that there 
are no fully robust empirical generaliz.ations; in every case there is at least 
one partial counter example." 
Williamson and Haggard's approach was descriptive. This paper 
extends their ideas by seeking a statistical link between existing political 
and economic conditions on the one hand and a country's subsequent 
success or failure in economic and fiscal reform on the other hand. In 
other words, can we describe some set of political and economic 
conditions which will allow us to predict the likelihood of success or 
failure of fiscal reform? 
Much has been written on what constitutes economic reform.<!) For 
many economists, including Hirschman (1958), the most beneficial type 
of reform for long-run development was land reform. While Williamson 
and Haggard conclude that land reform is still an important and viable 
policy tool (especially for Latin American economic development), they 
adopt a broader definition of policy reform developed in the late 1980s 
and named the "Washington consensus" (see Willamson, 1990). The 
Washington consensus, comprised of ten separate policies, can be 
summarized under the three broader headings of macroeconomic 
stabiliz.ation, economic liberaliz.ation toward a market system, and the 
opening of the economy to world influences. It is interesting to note that 
these policies are "good" for First, Second and Third World countries. 
Since the convictiort that economic reform will lead to long-run 
benefits may not be widely held by either economists, politicians, the 
general public, or especially specific interest groups which may suffer 
immediate or short-term losses, Williamson and Haggard focus on the 
strategy of economic reform. They conclude that economists ..... must 
be concerned with the conditions under which their advice is followed, 
and this implies a need to concern themselves with questions of political 
economy" (Williamson and Haggard, 1994: 531). 
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
mm;""'"'"n :mo Haggard (1994) list thirteen conditions 
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economic reforms. The thirteen conditions ar 
general categories· economic di. . . e grouped under four 
of the implementi~g team an~ tions, polmcal conditions, the position 
described as follows: ' e nature of the program itself. These are 
Economic Conditions 
1. ~rises: _may shock countries from traditional 
d1sorgamze opposing interest groups. approach and 
2. ~:!:~~: ~~~p: may support change through both intellectual and 
Political Conditions 
3. Authoritarian regime: m b 
potential reforms. c2> ay e more successful in carrying out 
4. ~ig~~ wing government: policy reform is inherently a right wing 
n mn and more than likely only introduced by such government. a 
5. Honey~o~n hypothesis: economic reformers may have reater 
success m implementing change soon after election. g 
6. Solid political base: needed even if reforms are unpopular. 
7. Fragmented/demoralized opposition· weak and d" "d d .. 
makes reform easier. · 1v1 e opposmon 
8. Social consensus· pol" · h 
to last. . ic1es reac through consensus are more likely 
9. Visionary leader: strong leadership and willingness to take risks. 
Position of Team 
10. Coherent economic team: must be united on economic strategy. 
11. Presence of a technopol. . 
1. . . . . · economists should be in a position of po It1cal respons1b1hty as opposed to merely technical advisers. 
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The Reform Program 
12. Comprehensiveness of program: re~ormers nee? to set up a 
comprehensive program capable of quick accomphshment. 
13. voodoo politics: reformers should not d~lare specific intentions ~o 
the public before election -- rather promise they can cure economic 
ills painlessly. 
COUNTRY CHOICE 
As noted Williamson and Haggard (1994) conducted a case by case 
study of individual countries -- a sample which included bot~ develop~d 
and developing countries. The criteria for a country to be mcluded m 
their sample was (a) that the country had attempted a well-de~ned post-
1960 economic reform program, and (b) t~at enou~h da~ existed. T?e 
thirteen countries examined were: Austraha, Braztl, Chtle, Colombia, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, New Zeala~d, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, and Turkey. Only in the cases of Brazil and Peru was reform not 
successfully consolidated. 
· While Williamson and Haggard (1994) did not claim randomness 
in the sample selection, and also admitted to bias is cho?sing "successes," 
they concluded that none of the conditions was either necessary ?r 
sufficient for successful reform. However, they conclu~e? that certam 
conditions seemed important: the need for a strong pohttcal base, for 
visionary leadership, and for a coherent econ~mic team. Several ?ther 
conditions were important enough to be considered by ref~rm-mmded 
leaders. This was especially true for external financial support 
(Williamson and Haggard, 1994: 589). 
A COUNTRY PROFILE ANALYSIS 
In extending Williamson and Haggard's study, we e?1ployed a 
discriminant analysis to see if we could predict success. or fatlure based 
on a set of existing conditions (the independent vanables).. Befo~e 
starting the analysis, we enlarged the original s~mple o.f countrt~ by six 
to get more robust results. Argentina, India, Pakistan, Sn Lanka, 
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T~~and, and Venezuela met the original inclusion conditions set forth by 
Wilhamson and Haggard and were included for a sample size of nineteen. 
The Independent Variables 
. ~nitially, ~ch country was "scored" in terms of the pre-existing 
conditions descnbed above. In our opinion, three of the original thirteen 
conditions (honeymoon period, technopols, and voodoo politics) were too 
subjective for measurement and were excluded. Each of the four general 
groups listed by Williamson and Haggard were still represented by the 
remaining ten conditions. 
For each country, the ten conditions were given a score between 1 
and 4. A score of 1 represented a non-existent condition (in Williamson 
and Haggard's terminology an "unsatisfied hypothesis"), and a score of 
4 indicated a fully satisfied condition. Table 1 describes the attributes 
requ~r.ed for scores of 1 and 4. Scores of 2 or 3 would represent 
condmons clo~e to 1.or 4, respectively. The scoring was completed using 
con.tent analysis apphed to the original study by Williamson and Haggard, 
various country studies, and the Financia.l Times. The scores, shown in 
Table 2, represent the predicting (or independent) variables in the 
TABLE! 












Score of 1 Score of 4 
Democracy Authoritarian 
Left-wing Government Rightist Government 
No Crises Severe Crises 
No Political Base Broad Political Base 
Strong Motivated Demoralized Opposition 
Opposition 
No Social Consensus 
Weak Visionless Leader 
No Organized Coherence 
Piece-meal Program 
No Aid 
Strong Social Consensus 
Strong Visionary Leader 
Organized Coherent Team 
Comprehensive Program 
Intellectual and Financial 
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discriminant analysis. While these scores are necessarily arbitrary, we 
feel that Table 2 results fairly represents the conditions in place when 
reforms were enacted. 
The Grouping Variable 
The grouping variable in this paper is a composite measure of actual 
success (or failure) each country experienced in adapting to economic and 
political reform. Since no individual measure reflects "success," three 
financial indicators were used and then combined into one score. The 
indicators are changes in (a) the fiscal deficit or surplus as a percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (b) the level of aggregate domestic credit 
as a percent of GDP, and (3) percentage changes in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). All data came from the International Monetary Fund (various issues). 
Data were collected for each country for a seven year period:<3) three 
years before and three years after refonn introduction and also for the year 
in which the refonn took place. Percent changes in the variables were 
calculated for a one, two, and three year period before policy 
implementation and the same measure was calculated for three similar 
periods after reform introduction. The percentage changes for the similar 
time periods ( before and after) were then compared and assigned a score 
from 1 to 3. Countries showing a consistent positive change in the 
variable-- consistently lower deficits, increases in domestic credit or 
lower inflation-- received a score of 3. A score of 1 was assigned for 
consistent negative change. A score of 2 was assigned where the pattern 
was mixed.'4) 
A weighted average of the scores was calculated: the deficit and the 
CPI were each weighted twice as heavily as the domestic credit score 
reflecting the main emphasis of the initial reform which was to 
immediately enjoy lower deficits and inflation. The weighted average was 
expressed in a three point scale as follows: 
Aggregate Score ~ 
0-9 1 
10 - 13 2 
14 - 15 3 
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Thus individual countries fell into thre.e distinct ?r~ups de~ending on 
their relative success or failure (se.e Table 3). It ~s mterestmg to note 
t our results for Brazil and Peru -- a failure -- replicate tho.se s~g~ested ~~Williamson and Hag~ard (1994). However, our sconng md1cates 
reform failure in Colombia. 
Results 
A step-wise discriminant analysis ~as conducte~ whe~ th~ in*~! 
. ·n was the country success/failure score m Ta e . r~~~g~n~ent variables are used to predict the grouping based lon ~~ 
existing conditions at time of reform ('fable 2); Impo:U~~y~f the 
discriminant analysis correctly predicted the country s group m . 
ses -- a roximately 95 percent of the time. The exception was ~e~co who;~ initial grouping was a 2 (the weighted average was 13). 
The discriminant analysis indicated that ~exico s~o~~d ha':;:~~~~ 
based on the existing economic and political vana es. tl 
analysis we conclude that the original score of 2 was correct -- apparen Y 
TABLE 3 
Success/Failure Scoring, by Country 








Poland 23 Pakistan 23 
Argentina 
Portugal 2 Venezuela 2 
Spain 2 India 2 
Chile 2 Thailand 3 
Indonesia 
3 
Sri Lanka 2 
South Korea 
Mexico 2 
Source: International Monetary Fund (various years). 
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the country has peculiarities (mostly political) which do not lend the 
country fitting into our hypotheses. Recent economic problems in 
Mexico reflect the inconsistencies of economic policy and the subjugation 
of economic policy to political desires. 
Interestingly, the results show that only three of the ten existing 
conditions --a visionary leader, a comprehensive program, and the 
existence of a crisis-- seem important in predicting ultimate success or 
failure of policy reform. Williamson and Haggard concluded a different 
set of important pre-existing conditions --a visionary leader, a strong 
political base, and a comprehensive reform program (and to a lesser 
degree external aid)-- were suggestive of success. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has extended Williamson and Haggard's work (1994) by 
examining whether or not any statistical relationship exists between 
successful reform and existing political/economic conditions in place at 
the time of reform. The initial grouping variable was a score reflecting 
relative success or failure in ninete.en different countries. The independent 
variables were assigned scores for ten existing conditions at the time of 
reform. Our purpose was to see if we could predict success or failure 
using this set of variables. We were able to do so in eighteen of nineteen 
cases, with Mexico as the exception. However, only three conditions --
existence of a visionary leader, whether or not a comprehensive reform 
program exists, and the presence of a crisis in the country-- seem to 
account for subsequent success. These three variables fall under the 1 
general categories of political conditions and the nature of the program 
itself. The remaining seven variables which fall under the "economic 
conditions" or "position of the team" apparently had little effect on 
reform. While important in their own right, they did not seem to be 
prerequisites for predicting success in this sample of countries. The 
Willamson and Haggard study suggested a different set of variables are 
important as the base for successful reform. Further research would be 
well directed at more in depth case studies and also statistical analyses to 
uncover valid predictors of successful reform. 
NOTES 
I. For an excellent review of the literature. c:.ee (;:i,..i.., :i~-' ur- - - -
If""~-
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2. For a wider discussion on regimes, see Looney and Frederiksen 
(1987). 
3. Available from authors upon request. 
4. Where a data point was missing, a score of 2 was automatically 
assigned. 
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